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Chapter 10
On
February 26, after Iraqi troops had already fled the country, coalition forces
entered Kuwait City, where they were met by a jubilant crowd. They were
accompanied, of course, by television crews and soon live satellite feeds from
Kuwait City were broadcast by CBS, CNN, ABC, and finally NBC. CBS's Dan Rather,
his eyes moist with tears, vigorously shook the hand of an American officer,
saying, "Congratulations for a job well done." The media had well
served the Pentagon during the war and enthusiastically participated in the
ecstasy of victory. The March 11 Newsweek had a laughing Norman
Schwarzkopf on its cover with the triumphant inscription "VICTORY!"
while U.S. News and World Report scripted "KNOCKOUT!" above
the pictures of a moving tank (see Figure 10.1).
Excited
Kuwaitis greeted the troops and media crews as conquering heroes, and Kuwaiti
citizens, resistance fighters, and foreign citizens who had been trapped in the
city all had their fifteen minutes of media celebrity. Atrocity stories were
told, hatred of the Iraqis was expressed repeatedly, and Kuwaitis happily waved
pictures of the emir. Kuwaitis also chanted the name of George Bush, whose
country eventually won billions of dollars worth of contracts to rebuild the
country. Of course, Bush could have easily liberated Kuwait as early as August
through pursuing a diplomatic settlement, and could have pursued the Iraqi or
Soviet peace initiatives of the past weeks, saving the country and environment
much destruction. The "liberation" of Kuwait was as phony and
hypocritical as the Gulf war itself.
On
February 27, George Bush appeared on television to halt the U.S.-led
extermination of Iraqi troops. He declared Kuwait liberated and Iraq defeated.
In the mode of control characteristic of technowar, Bush dictated stiff terms
for a full cease-fire and so was able to impose his will on the defeated and
massively overpowered Iraqis. The Gulf war was a great triumph for George Bush,
establishing him as the leader of the Neoimperialist World Order. In the
aftermath of the Gulf war, however, there was a brief revelation of the U.S.
atrocities against the fleeing Iraqis during the last two days of the war
(10.2). But the liberation of Kuwait and revelation of Iraqi atrocities against
Kuwaitis during the occupation (10.1) conveniently pushed U.S. atrocities out
of the news and produced a climate in which Bush could bask in the warm glow of
victory and win the highest approval ratings for a U.S. president in modern
history. The war thus ended with a series of propaganda victories in addition
to the military victory.
The
ecological consequences of the war, however, were impossible to control
completely (10.3), as were the turbulent passions unleashed by the Pandora's
box of the Persian Gulf war (10.4). Consequently, unpleasant news continued to
emanate from Kuwait and Iraq for some time after military hostilities ceased.
Uprisings by rebel forces in southern Iraq and Kurdish forces in northern Iraq
were violently suppressed by Saddam Hussein and his military, which was not
rendered as ineffectual as Schwarzkopf had claimed. Moreover, eventually the
popularity of George Bush and the war would fade and people would see that the
U.S. military adventure really produced little of value for the people of the
United States and the Middle East (10.5).
As
the days and months went by, Hussein seemed as firmly in control as ever.
Moreover, suspicions emerged in July 1991, concerning whether the U.S.-led
coalition had destroyed his nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons programs
to the extent previously asserted by Schwarzkopf and his minions. Reports also
began surfacing of the horrible suffering of the Iraqi people caused by the
U.S.-led coalition bombing as epidemics, lack of medical care, and malnutrition
threatened to take hundreds of thousands more lives in addition to the civilian
and military casualties already inflicted. The Kuwaiti oil fires threatened the
health and environment of the region and many forecasted a "nuclear
winter" effect, if the fires were not extinguished and if the smoke
blocked out the sun and disrupted weather patterns across the planet. Hence,
the people and environment of the region continued to suffer the violence of
the war long after the euphoria of the U.S. victory had subsided.
In
this chapter, I shall argue that the aftermath of the Gulf war reveals that
little of value was gained by this human and environmental holocaust for the
United States or the people of the region. Time magazine posed the
question "Was It Worth It?" on its August 5, 1991, cover. The
aftermath of the war left Saddam Hussein in power and many people concluded
that the affair had produced nothing but new regional instability, the
slaughter of tens of thousands of Iraqis, and "near apocalyptic
conditions" in Iraq, as well as one of the worst environmental disasters
in history. Millions of people had been displaced by the crisis and war, Kuwait
was in ruin and chaos, and the whole episode wasted hundreds of billions of
dollars (see Note 2 in the Preface for figures). In addition, the Gulf war
brutalized U.S. culture and created the conditions for a resurgence of
militarism that deflected attention from pressing social and economic problems
(10.5). The experience also brutalized Kuwait and the aftermath of its
"liberation" was extremely unpleasant, as we shall see in the next
section.
10.1
Torture and Other Atrocities
During
the period from the eve of the ground war through the end of the war, a
propaganda campaign circulated stories concerning Iraqi atrocities against
Kuwaitis. On February 23, the day that the ground war began, Gen. Butch Neal
continued to lie dutifully for his country, claiming that "[t]here seems
to be a systematic campaign of execution, particularly people that they [the
Iraqis] may have tortured previously. They're sort of destroying the evidence,
I guess, for lack of a better term." Robert Gates, Bush's deputy national
security adviser, and current head of the CIA, said in a February 24 interview
on CNN that there were "large scale executions and torture,
mutiliation" and other atrocities being committed in Kuwait: "we are
hearing that they may be setting fire to Kuwait City itself, large sections of
the city are in flames. This is a sort of a medieval practice."[1]
Continuing
the propaganda campaign, Saudi Gen. Khalid reported on February 25 that Iraqis
in Kuwait were committing "unspeakable acts," including smashing
heads in with axes, rape, and dismembering Kuwaitis and hanging their parts in
public places. General Schwarzkopf also spoke in his briefing of February 27 of
"unspeakable atrocities" that reporters would discover in Kuwait City
and claimed that the Iraqis had taken "up to 40,000 [hostages]." The
television networks circulated these stories without much skepticism. CNN was
particularly guilty and CBS's Dan Rather once had to remind correspondent Eric
Engberg that one should not always accept such stories at face value as Engberg
was enthusiastically rattling off a list of recent Iraqi horrors fed to him by
his military handlers.
More
skeptically, the New York Times of February 26 cited Andrew Whitly,
director of Middle East Watch, an independent human-rights group, who warned
about "the self-interested nature of the sources and the timing of their
announcements" (p. A10). The Times also cited refugees from Kuwait
who had just arrived at the Jordanian border and "said they saw no
evidence of the widescale atrocities alleged by Kuwaiti exile groups and some
American officials." One refugee, Ghazi Hijazi, a businessman, said that,
"Iraqi troops are treating people well. They are not bothering them"
(p. A10). National Public Radio's John Hockenberry interviewed refugees from
Kuwait City in Amman, Jordan, on February 26 who said that they had not seen
the alleged burning buildings and murdered civilians. Some Iraqi atrocities
were documented when coalition troops entered the city, but it was discovered
that the atrocity stories were greatly exaggerated,[2]
though the TV networks continued to circulate them daily, falling prey to
another Kuwaiti/U.S. disinformation campaign (see 2.1 for discussion of the
earlier campaigns during the crisis in the Gulf).
On
February 28, ABC's "Nightline" had a segment on the Iraqi atrocities
against Kuwaitis. Host Ted Koppel recalled an episode after the Iraqi invasion
in September when a young woman called him from Kuwait to tell of the
atrocities being committed against the Kuwaiti people. Koppel claimed that he
had reason to believe that this woman was captured, tortured, and killed by the
Iraqis. After playing a tape of his earlier telephone interview with the woman,
Koppel brought on a Kuwaiti "doctor," who was allegedly a resistance
fighter, to detail her fate which the "doctor" described as "the
worst I've seen all through the last six-and-a-half months."[3] The "doctor" then depicted in
detail her torture, her mutilation, with her head cut by an axe into three
pieces, and the depositing of her body in front of her house.
The
doctor's face was concealed with the gutras, a Kuwaiti headdress,
wrapped around it and when asked why he was hiding his identity, he replied
that Kuwait City was still not completely safe. This claim was suspicious
because everyone else in Kuwait City seemed eager to tell his or her story of
the Iraqi occupation directly to the camera. Finally, the "doctor"
provided details of other Iraqi torture and execution of Kuwaitis illustrated
by pictures that the doctor had allegedly taken himself in hospitals and the
morgue, to document the atrocities. The pictures looked suspiciously like the
ones used by the Free Kuwait and Hill and Knowlton cabal at the UN and
Congressional exhibitions of Iraqi atrocities.
It
appears that the Kuwaiti doctor may have been part of a propaganda campaign, first,
because he was quick to tell Ted Koppel exactly the story about the young
Kuwaiti resistance fighter that fit into Koppel's videotape of her call to his
show earlier when she revealed the Iraqi atrocities in Kuwait City. Moreover,
the "doctor's" example of atrocities was suspicious in that the
Iraqis splitting a head into three pieces with an axe was precisely the grisly
example referred to by Gen. Khalid at the Saudi briefing a few days before. The
"doctor's" hiding of his identity was also suspicious, repeating the
ploy of the "doctor" who had earlier told the much-publicized and
then discredited story of the Iraqis killing premature babies by robbing their
incubators. His pictures of Kuwaitis tortured by Iraqis appeared quite similar
to the ones presented at the UN and Congress by the Kuwaiti exile movement (see
2.1). It was therefore entirely possible that the "doctor" was part
of a Kuwaiti-U.S. propaganda campaign to dramatize atrocities for a world ready
to believe anything about the demonized Iraqis.[4]
The "doctor" recounted
additional horror stories and said that tortured and executed victims numbered
in the hundreds and those who were tortured, imprisoned, and released totaled
in the thousands. When asked if Kuwaitis wanted to exact revenge from the
Iraqis who were imprisoned in Kuwait, he answered that they were treating the
Iraqi prisoners humanely and even giving them medical treatment, precisely the
Kuwaiti government line of the moment. Within a few days, however, it was
revealed that Kuwaitis were at that very moment systematically killing Iraqis
and Palestinians suspected of being collaborators in extremely brutal ways, so
the "doctor" here might have been producing propaganda to deflect
attention from Kuwaiti atrocities to Iraqi ones.
Furthermore,
the "doctor" claimed that the health conditions for the Kuwaiti
people were currently very poor because of the Iraqi destruction of the water
desalination plant (earlier said to have been destroyed by the oil spill), but
that water was being brought in and in general they were overall "in good
shape" (again, the line being advanced by the Kuwaiti government). The
"doctor" appeared the next morning on ABC's "Good Morning
America" where he was interviewed, still hiding his identity, about Iraqi
crimes during the occupation. This episode raises questions concerning the
responsibilities of TV networks in serving as conduits for propaganda of the
U.S. or foreign governments and the precautions that they should take. Did ABC
attempt to discover if the woman resistance fighter actually existed or whether
she was an invention of a Kuwaiti exile propaganda group? What efforts did ABC
take to check into the identity of the "doctor" and what evidence did
they have that his testimony was genuine? Instead of exhibiting any skepticism,
Koppel and ABC presented the "doctor" simply as an objective
authority, eyewitness to the truth concerning Iraqi brutality. They raised no
questions concerning his authenticity and the accuracy of these reports and
simply conveyed his assertions as facts, thus potentially falling prey to a
Kuwaiti propaganda campaign. ABC also failed to note the similarity of the
pictures of Kuwaiti torture victims that the "doctor" allegedly took
to the ones displayed in Washington and New York during the congressional and
UN hearings when the Free Kuwait group submitted evidence of Iraqi atrocities.
Thus, it appears that
ABC became part of a highly orchestrated propaganda campaign to circulate
stories of Iraqi atrocities, as did other television networks, which were also
quick to circulate such stories without checking their veracity or raising any
questions concerning their authenticity. Charles Jaco of CNN, closely connected
to the Kuwaiti resistance throughout the war, was especially susceptible to
Kuwaiti propaganda stories concerning the Iraqis. In his reports from
"liberated" Kuwait City, he presented the stories of his sources, who
recounted Iraqi atrocities simply as fact, thus becoming a vehicle for the
positions that the Kuwaiti government wanted circulated.
The
New York Times on February 28 did deflate the Iraqi atrocity story
favored by George Bush, Dan Quayle, and several high-ranking generals who
repeated incessantly the story of how Iraq entered a hospital after the war and
took premature babies out of incubators, throwing them on the floor and leaving
them to die, so that the incubators could be used in Iraq (see 2.1). The Times
reported: "Some of the atrocities that had been reported, such as the
killing of infants in the main hospitals shortly after the invasion, are untrue
or have been exaggerated, Kuwaitis said. Hospital officials, for instance, said
that stories circulated about the killing of 300 children were incorrect"
(Feb. 28, 1991, p. A6). ABC's John Martin did a follow-up on the story on March
15, interviewing doctors in the hospitals where the alleged Iraqi crimes took
place. One doctor showed Martin the incubators which hospital officials had
hidden during the Iraqi occupation and other doctors indicated that there were
"no nurses to take care of these babies and that's why they died."[5]
Martin
also revealed in his ABC report that reports of Iraqi hostage taking were
exaggerated. While General Schwarzkopf claimed in his February 27 briefing that
40,000 Kuwaitis were taken prisoner, Kuwaiti authorities later stated that the
numbers were more like 1,500-3,000. On the other hand, the figure of 4,000
hostages cited by the BBC continued to circulate and Susan Sachs reported on
July 28, 1991 that, "The whereabouts of some 4,000 Kuwaitis arrested by
Iraqi occupation troops are still unknown" (Newsday, p. 39). Hence,
Kuwaiti authorities might have wanted to play down the number of Kuwaitis taken
hostage by the fleeing Iraqis and quite probably slaughtered with the Iraqi
army and those fleeing Kuwait (see 10.2). Finally, Martin claimed that the
reports of thousands of Kuwaitis executed by Iraqi soldiers, circulated by
U.S., Saudi, and other authorities, were also exaggerated and that the
"real number" is "something around a little bit over 300."
Reporters
found that the claims of Robert Gates and others concerning widespread damage
to the city were also highly exaggerated. There was extensive damage to the
city, but much of it could be attributed to coalition bombing or the Kuwaiti
resistance.[6]
A Post reporter observed that, "Throughout the city, destruction
was spotty. Windows of some stores, such as jewelry and watch shops, were
smashed and the contents looted. Many others were left untouched. Gaping holes
yawned in the sides of several posh hotels....Overall, however, most buildings
throughout the city remained undisturbed" (Febr. 28, 1991). By March 1,
gas was available and the Kuwaiti interior minister stated on March 4 that
electricity and water could be restored to the city in a few days. Newsweek
reported that the airport was functional, roads and water system were basically
in good shape, and that backup electrical generators were available to restore
power. One military official told the magazine a week after the ceasefire that,
"'[t]he bottom line is that damage is not as extensive as had been
thought'" (March 11, 1991, p. 33).
On
March 4, the first member of the Royal Family returned to Kuwait; Crown Prince
Sheik Saad al-Abdullah al-Sabah kissed the ground and declared a return to the
official rule by his family. CNN's Tom Mintier reported that the Kuwaiti
resistance movement announced that it was turning in its weapons. According to
Mintier (and this is pure disinformation), the resistance forces were planning
to officially disband and give power back to the former government. And then,
in an episode on March 4 that suggested more propaganda, an alleged member of
the resistance came on camera, his face shrouded with his shawl and thick
glasses. The "resistance fighter" proclaimed that the Kuwaiti
resistance was giving up its weapons and "will have democracy peacefully
and without guns." Obviously, the Kuwaiti government wanted the resistance
to give up their guns and it used the bait of promised democracy to get them to
surrender their weapons and dissolve the resistance organizations, which
constituted a threat to the autocratic policies of the al-Sabah family.[7]
The
genuine Kuwaiti resistance fighters that surfaced immediately after the
liberation of Kuwait were magnificent, as fighters against oppression usually
are. The early pictures of the resistance fighters showed courageous and heroic
young men and women, armed, fighting for the liberation of their country,
arresting Iraqis, and policing the area, while protecting its citizens. During
the occupation, they had provided food, medical aid, security, and hope to the
Kuwaitis who suffered the Iraqi occupation. They were organized in small,
well-disciplined cells and risked their lives to preserve their country and
people while the rich Kuwaiti exiles frolicked in Monte Carlo, London, or other
comfortable locales.
The
resistance members were now, however, an impediment to the Kuwaiti Royal
Family, who wished to reestablish its autocratic rule. The resistance was experienced
in the art of self-government; many were genuine champions of democracy who
took responsibility for the well-being and survival of their people in an
incredibly difficult situation. They were freedom fighters who were prepared to
die for their independence. They were also armed and seasoned fighters who
wanted democracy and who had the prestige and the military skills to demand it.
The resistance fighters thus posed a significant challenge to the ruling
family, which had already announced that it would impose martial law for three
months and would not recall the Kuwaiti parliament or give women rights, as
they had promised earlier, "until things are better." The former
Kuwaiti regime thus had the interest of first disarming and then marginalizing
the Kuwaiti resistance forces so as to secure their own continued authoritarian
rule; the U.S. media, with some exceptions, were furthering this goal.
Indeed,
the U.S. government was siding, as conservative governments usually do, with
the Kuwaiti ruling family. The U.S. government was keenly interested in
securing lucrative contracts (estimated at $100 to $200 billion) for U.S. firms
to help rebuild Kuwait, and early estimates indicated that U.S. corporations
received over 70 percent of the initial contracts.[8]
The U.S. government and its corporations could best do business with the former
Kuwaiti ruling circles and were probably not particularly interested in
democracy and the fate of the Kuwaiti resistance. U.S. officials pay lip
service to democracy, but do business with the autocrats. Indeed, while the
United States pretends to be committed to democracy, the primary national
allegiance, particularly of the Bush administration, is to capitalism (see
Kellner 1990). Therefore, the U.S. corporations and the capitalist state were
eager to do business with the ruling elite with whom U.S. business interests
already had relations and who could be counted on to provide lucrative deals.
In
helping promote the Kuwaiti government line that the resistance should surrender
their arms and submit to the al-Sabah's rule, the media were thus promoting the
interests of the U.S. government and those firms seeking to do business with
the Royal Family. However, on March 4 and 5, there were some TV stories
critical of the al-Sabah family, and some positive stories on the Kuwaiti
resistance and its demands for democratization aired. ABC's
"Nightline" of March 4 featured an interview with a prominent Kuwaiti
businessman who accused the al-Sabah family of hiring assassination squads to
murder members of the Kuwaiti resistance. Host Ted Koppel also interviewed a
leading member of the prodemocracy movement who had been shot by a Kuwaiti in
his house and was now paralyzed. As Koppel held his hand in a hospital-bed
interview, the Kuwaiti democrat told him that the shooting was deliberate,
though he hesitated to name his assassin.
The
Kuwaiti UN ambassador, a member of the al-Sabah family, vehemently denied that
his family was involved in political assassinations. He claimed that members of
his family had stayed in Kuwait and struggled in the resistance, attempting to
undermine the distinction being made by resistance members between those who
stayed and struggled and those who left the country. The ambassador defended
the three-month imposition of martial law and then promised that there would be
democratization, though by spring 1992 no democratic reforms had yet
materialized.[9]
Early
in the morning on March 5, CNN featured stories of prodemocracy Kuwaiti
resistance forces, who did not want to surrender their guns and were calling
for democratization. A male professor urged more democracy and a female
resistance fighter argued for equal rights for women, who had served heroically
in the resistance. The episode also showed resistance members continuing to
police streets, "often meting out their own justice," which involved
assassination of Iraqi secret police, Palestinian collaborators, and those
involved in atrocities against Kuwaitis, as the mainstream media was beginning
to report. Both members of the resistance movement and Kuwaiti troops who were
now occupying the city were carrying out vigilante actions, which the U.S.
media noted but did not investigate.
However,
CNN continued to circulate daily Iraqi atrocity stories, including the
incubator story, which had been thoroughly discredited. On both March 5 and 6,
CNN ran a story about grave-diggers in Kuwait who allegedly buried over forty
victims of the incubator atrocity in mass graves. This was somewhat astonishing
in the light of the exposure of the story and showed the extent to which CNN
was manipulated by Kuwaiti disinformation campaigns.
In
any case, Kuwait was now "liberated" and the old ruling powers
returned to consolidate their autocratic rule. The country suffered under
martial law and a primitive form of "justice" in which those who were
suspected of collaboration with the Iraqis were summarily executed. Robert
Fisk, a reporter for the British Independent, told of U.S. Special
Forces troops looking on as Kuwaitis brutalized Iraqis and Palestinians. When
Fisk and an associate tried to intervene when three Kuwaiti soldier were
beating up a Palestinian boy, the U.S. troops pushed him aside, telling him,
"This is martial law, boy. Fuck off." Then, smiling, the U.S. soldier
told him to "have a nice day" (The Independent, March 4,
1991). Undeniably, there was a rash of vigilante executions of Iraqis and those
suspected of collaborating with the Iraqi regime during the occupation in the
days after the liberation.[10]
Mass graves, holding up to fifty-four "unidentified bodies" of people
who appeared to have died since March, indicated organized and
"official" mass murder by Kuwaiti authorities. Kenneth Roth, deputy
director of Human Rights Watch, stated in a New York Times Op-Ed piece
that other documented "post-liberation killings of people in police and
military custody substantiates this view" (June 11, 1991).
The
return of Kuwaiti "legal" institutions did not help matters much.
During a series of well-publicized "trials" in June 1991, individuals
were sentenced to long prison terms and sometimes death on the word of
informers. Those charged with collaboration were denied access to lawyers and
one young man was sentenced to twenty years imprisonment for wearing a T-shirt
embroidered with the figure of Saddam Hussein; he claimed that he had owned it
before the war and merely slept in it occasionally. Women employed as servants
of Kuwaitis complained of a dramatic increase in rape, often by Kuwaiti
soldiers. Seven entertainers were sentenced to life in prison for "taking
part in an Iraqi-established union for artists" and for
"propagandizing" in their profession. The government seemed incapable
of getting the country running again, and pollution from oil fires rendered the
country virtually unlivable (10.3). Talk of democratic reform subsided and U.S.
corporations greedily competed for contracts.
In
a speech to Congress on March 6, George Bush orated that we will "forge a
future that should never again be held hostage to the darker side of human
nature.... A world in which freedom and respect for human rights find a home
among all nations. The Gulf war put this new world to its first test, and, my
fellow Americans, we passed the test." At the time of his speech, mass
arrests, street executions, torture, and rape were the order of the day in
"liberated" Kuwait. Oppression continued and Bush supported the
nondemocratic government forces by stating during a July 1, 1991, press
conference in response to a reporter's question about repression in Kuwait,
"The war was not fought about democracy in Kuwait....I think we're
expecting a little much if we're asking the people of Kuwait to take kindly to
those that had spied on their countrymen that were left there, that had
brutalized their families there and things of that nature." Showing their
appreciation, the Kuwaiti government daily Sawt al-Kuwan ran these
comments on its front page July 3, 1991: "Bush declares his understanding
of Kuwait's attitude towards collaborators" (Middle East Watch 1991).
Business had returned to usual--but worse.
Kuwait
refused to let many of its citizens back in the country after its liberation,
including many who were visiting Iraq, in some cases, visiting relatives taken
hostage during the crisis. Kuwait refused to let many foreign workers return,
including Egyptians and workers from other members of the coalition. Susan
Sachs reported on June 9, 1991 that, "Miffed at the gulf states'
ambivalence about keeping wartime promises of jobs and financial aid, Egypt and
Syria are withdrawing troops that were supposed to form the core of a new gulf
security force.... An underlying theme is that Kuwaitis are ungrateful" (Newsday,
p. 13). And greedy: "Recent advertisements by landlords in Kuwait,
including one member of the ruling al-Sabah family, warn displaced tenants to
pay rent for the months of Iraqi occupation in five days or lose the belongings
left in their Kuwait apartments" (Newsday, p. 13).
10.2 High-Tech Massacre
Meanwhile,
as the hoards of reporters invaded Kuwait, images began to emerge of the extent
of massacre of Iraqis by the U.S.-led coalition forces. Few scenes shown of
actual fighting in the Kuwaiti and Iraqi theaters of death appeared during the
last several days of the war. The pool system had assured that the military
would control what images would be shown of the combat. Although there were a
few images of wounded U.S. troops, there were no images of the slaughter of
Iraqis by the U.S.-led coalition. There was also little discussion of the extent
of Iraqi casualties in the mainstream media. Schwarzkopf and other coalition
military leaders refused to speculate on the number of Iraqi dead, and there
were few mainstream media inquiries into the topic.
The
New York Times published an article on March 1 which minimized Iraqi
casualties. A front-page story by John H. Cushman, Jr., was headlined:
"Military Experts See a Death Toll of 25,000 to 50,000 Iraqi troops."[11]
Note that Iraqi casualties went down already from the 85,000-100,000 casualty
figures cited by the Saudis the day before, suggesting that a sanitizing
process was underway. Cushman's sources were "military experts,"
probably the most vacuous sources imaginable. The story then cited several
other estimates, with the largest being the 85,000-100,000 Saudi estimate. But
there was no discussion of how these estimates were reached. Cushman did quote
General Schwarzkopf who said that there would be no official counting of Iraqi
casualties, which he contrasted with a report that President Bush had ordered
General Powell to undertake an analysis of the number of Iraqis killed as the
war progressed. If the process will be similar to the report undertaken of
casualties during the Panama invasion, one could expect more lies and another
cover-up.[12]
At
the afternoon Pentagon briefing on March 1, Gen. Thomas Kelly said bluntly that
the United States was not in the game of counting casualties and when pushed
said that they had "killed an entire army."[13]
Details of the magnitude of the systematic annihilation of the Iraqis emerged,
however, when reporters journeyed up the highway leading from Kuwait City to
Iraq, and about twenty miles from the city found evidence of a tremendous
slaughter of Iraqis who were fleeing from Kuwait. The first report on what became
known as "the Highway of Death" was broadcast on CNN during the
morning of March 1, which showed pictures of the road from Kuwait City to the
Iraqi border. According to CNN correspondent Tom Mintier, video had just
surfaced of a scene outside of Kuwait City depicting "vehicles who were
going nowhere." The fleeing Iraqis took any vehicles that they could find
to drive to Iraq and when they got outside of the city the allies put a pincer
movement on them. They were hit by allied aircraft and artillery in place along
the highway, producing a massive traffic jam and subsequent slaughter. The
vehicles included civilian cars, buses, trucks, tanks, fire engines, and
armored vehicles, some of which burned together as they caught fire and then
exploded, producing a conflagration from which no few, if any, escaped. There
were hundreds of victims, Mintier reported, and charred bodies, burned beyond
recognition, were evident inside and around the vehicles.
The
video showed pictures of a highway littered with civilian and military vehicles
that had been destroyed in one of the most massive slaughters by air power in
history. There were images of one
vehicle after another, mile after mile, piled upon each other, evoking a
picture of a giant traffic jam in which planes bombed and destroyed anything
below themselves. Mintier stated that there may have been heavy civilian
casualties, and it was not certain if the victims were Iraqis, their Kuwaiti
hostages, or fleeing Palestinians.
CNN
then cut to a piece on the opening of the U.S. embassy in Kuwait and next to a
story of Iraqi atrocities in Kuwait, as if to justify the slaughter. As the
story was developed through the day, more legitimations of the systematic
killing were produced by CNN and the other television networks. A CNN report
cut to a U.S. soldier on the highway who laughed and smiled, saying, "This
is absolute chaos. This is ridiculous." He indicated that all of the
vehicles were stolen and that the cars were full of military gear and stolen
consumer goods, such as television sets and other items. Thereafter, the
official U.S. military pushed the line that the corpses littering the highway
or burned in their vehicles were thieves fleeing the city in stolen vehicles
full of contraband goods.
For
the rest of the day the theme of the looters getting their due punishment was
privileged by the networks; one soldier remarked: "They're just looters,
not fighters" and this quote was repeated endlessly by CNN and the other
networks. All of the major network evening news accounts covered the story,
though none featured it and they all tended to play it down.[14]
The segment was generally framed by stories of Iraqi atrocities, which
presented the Iraqis as subhuman monsters and thus seemingly excused the
slaughter as just punishment. While there were, no doubt, torturers and even
killers among the fleeing crowd, there were also young Iraqi conscripts who
were in Kuwait against their will, as well as Kuwaitis, Palestinians, and
civilian forces in the masses of fleeing people consumed in an apocalyptic
fireball.
The
CBS reporting was especially apologetic. On March 1, CBS reported that the
pictures of mile after mile of wreckage were "evidence of the panic of a
fleeing army." The report then focused on Kuwaitis who were venturing back
onto the road: Some came to see the wreckage, while others came to see the dead
soldiers. "They got what they deserved. They are not human beings," a
Kuwaiti said on camera. The CBS report concluded that the area was still a
"dangerous place" with munitions and artillery pointed at Kuwait City
(which subliminally suggested that the slaughtered individuals were engaged in
a military operation against Kuwait City and thus deserved to die). The report
quickly cut back to Kuwait City with mobs of people surrounding the news crew
to joyfully chant "U.S.A! U.S.A!"
On
March 2, CBS ran an even more appalling justification for the Highway of Death.
A report by Eric Engberg featured Gen. Walter Boomer who justified the
slaughter on the Highway of Death: "In addition to being thoroughly
incompetent, they were thieves as well as murderers." A blonde crew-cut
soldier stated: "Seeing all the damage that we did to these guys, it
almost made it worth while for all the time we spent here." This
disgusting report shows the mechanisms of denial and projection at work, in
which the U.S. military and their complicit media accomplices deny coalition
crimes and project all evil on the Iraqis. CBS's effort to justify the
unjustifiable in this segment shows the depth of complicity of the media in
covering over and justifying U.S. crimes.
Mainstream
newspapers tended to downplay the story. The March 2 New York Times
inserted a couple of brief paragraphs concerning what was arguably one of the
major stories of the war in the middle of an article by R.A. Apple, who tersely
described the basic facts and, like the TV reporters, stressed the
"looters" angle (p. 6A).[15]
The mainstream media in Britain, however, were more critical of the desert
slaughter. A BBC report mentioned that the vehicles taken out of Kuwait City
were mostly civilian vehicles and that there were very few tanks or artillery
on the Highway of Death, raising the question whether the fleeing Iraqis with
their hostages were a legitimate military target. The BBC's Stephen Sackur also
discerned evidence of cluster bombs, antipersonnel weapons that are designed to
break up into hundreds of little bomblets to maximize damage to both humans and
machines. Sackur wrote: "It was the scale of the American attack that took
my breath away. Was it necessary to bomb the entire convoy? What threat could
these pathetic remnants of Saddam Hussein's beaten army have posed? Wasn't it
obvious that the people of the convoy would have given themselves up willingly
without the application of such ferocious weaponry?" (in MacArthur 1991,
p. 265).
On
the March 3, "This Week With David Brinkley" program, correspondent
Sam Donaldson had the bad manners to ask Bush's national security adviser,
Brent Scowcroft, a question concerning what he described as the
"annihilation" of the fleeing Iraqis north of Kuwait City. Scowcroft,
showing no remorse and offering no real explanation, answered that "our
objective was not to kill people but to destroy the offensive capability of
Iraq." Donaldson made the point, forgotten in the other media stories,
that thousands of Kuwaiti civilians were fleeing with the Iraqis, taken as
hostages. Scowcroft's stunning answer was that U.S. bombing was unlike any
other bombing in any previous conflict, because it was precision bombing.[16]
Because it was impossible to justify the slaughter of innocents, Scowcroft
conveniently fell back into the Big Lie of precision bombing. But here it was
utterly inappropriate because it appeared that the bombing was systematic and
rather precise during the last days of the war, in which Scowcroft's warriors
brutally wiped out everything in their kill zones with methodical precision
(though some Brits, Kuwaitis, and coalition "friendlies" were accidentally
killed as well). But in the case of the Highway of Death there was ample
evidence that the Iraqis were taking Kuwaiti hostages with them, though that
didn't stop the U.S. military and government from ordering and condoning the
massacre.
Donaldson
let Scowcroft get away with his hypocritical nonsequitur answer and
conservative ideologue George Will quickly changed the subject.[17]
Scowcroft relaxed, knowing that all he had to do was equivocate and the
question would be dropped. Watching Brent Scowcroft answer, or rather evade,
Donaldson's question, allowed one to see the cold demeanor of an individual
whose sense of national security is military security and who all of the
insider accounts of the genesis of the Gulf war suggest was, along with Bush,
the most resolute in pushing the war option and refusing all diplomatic
solutions (see 1.3).
There
was very little media discussion or commentary on the full scope of the
high-tech massacre, and almost no criticism of the operation. One report
observed that Marine Gen. Walter Boomer passed along a message to his
commanders from Norman Schwarzkopf "not to let anybody or anything out of
Kuwait" (Bill Gannon, Newark Star-Ledger, Feb. 27, 1991), but this
report was not picked up by the mainstream media. The Highway of Death was
briefly featured but there were few reports on the other killing fields of the
ground war. The other major route out of Kuwait to Iraq was a coastal route
running north to the Iraqi border city of Umm Qasr and according to an Army
officier on the scene there was "'nothing but shit strewn everywhere, five
to seven miles of just solid bombed-out vehicles. The U.S. Air Force, he said,
'had been given the word to work over that entire area, to find anything that
was moving and take it out'" (Michael Kelly, The New Republic,
April 1, 1991, p. 12). A Navy A-6 pilot noted that the convoy consisted of
"a 20-mile nose-to-tail jam" (Mike Gaines, Flight International,
March 6-12, p. 8).
A
powerful account of the carnage on the road to Umm Qasr, Kuwait, was found in
the Los Angeles Times in a story by Bob Drogin (March 10, 1991) which
contained much graphic detail.
For 60 miles,
hundreds of Iraqi tanks and armored cars, howitzers and antiaircraft guns,
ammunition trucks and ambulances were strafed, smashed and burned beyond
belief. Scores of soldiers lie in and around the vehicles, mangled and bloated
in the drifting desert sands....Every truck is riddled with shrapnel. No
looting by the dead soldiers was evident. No survivors are known or likely....
At one spot, snarling wild dogs have reduced two corpses to bare ribs. Giant
carrion birds claw and pick at another; only a boot-clad foot and eyeless skull
are recognizable (p. A1). [See also the graphic account by Michael Kelly in The
New Republic, April 1, 1991).
During
the high-tech massacre, U.S. air activity was frenzied and air controllers were
worried about collisions in the air. A report was dispatched from the USS Ranger
by Randall Richard of the Providence Journal that: "Air strikes
against Iraqi troops retreating from Kuwait were being launched so feverishly
from this carrier today that pilots said they took whatever bombs happened to
be closest to the flight deck. The crews, working to the strains of the Lone
Ranger theme, often passed up the projectile of choice... because it took too
long to load." A BBC radio report indicated that U.S. fighter planes were
lining up to take off from their aircraft carriers to the strains of the
William Tell Overture over the loudspeakers to go on what they called "The
Turkey Shoot." British military officials were quick to point out that
they did not participate in the Desert Slaughter and were perhaps embarrassed
by the excesses of their U.S. comrades-in-arms. Indeed, the metaphor of the
hunt was appropriate for the massacre. One pilot said that it "was like
shooting fish in a barrel," and Squadron leader Cmdr. Frank Sweigert said
that their human targets were "basically just sitting ducks" (Washington
Post, Feb. 27, 1991).
C-SPAN
broadcast an interview with two F-10 pilots, "Fish" and
"Karl," on February 27, taken from military pool footage.[18]
They described their pleasure in killing tank after tank, with Fish exploding
in wargasmic ecstasy when he described what it was like to see his target
explode. From the ground, the sight was not so pretty. London Independent
reporter Richard Dowden stated in a televised interview, "The lorries
further down the line would have tried to crash off the motorway and just get
away, just get off the road and [the coalition pilots] would have chased them,
and you saw them in the desert, and then you would see bodies going from those
lorries so they'd actually hunted down people who were just running away"
(PeaceNet, mideast.gulf, Feb. 27, 1991). The highway was literally awash with
blood, with one reporter writing, "As we drove slowly through the
wreckage, our armored personnel carrier's tracks splashed through great pools
of bloody water. We passed dead soldiers lying, as if resting, without a mark
on them. We found others cut up so badly, a pair of legs in its trousers would
be 50 yards from the top half of the body. Four soldiers had died under a truck
where they had sought protection" (Newsweek, March 11, 1991, p.
25).
In
the days following the end of the war, there were isolated reports of other
massive slaughters of fleeing Iraqi troops throughout northern Kuwait and
southern Iraq. On March 1, a convoy of Iraqi troops allegedly fired at U.S.
troops and the valiant warriors destroyed hundreds of Iraqi tanks and vehicles,
while slaughtering over 2,000 Iraqi soldiers, two days after Bush had called a
halt to military activities. In a report published in the May 8, 1991, Newsday,
Patrick Sloyan claimed that Schwarzkopf had ordered the massacre, described as
"the biggest clash of the gulf war's ground campaign," even though
fighting had ceased. Although the U.S. military briefer had claimed that day
that U.S. forces were using loudspeakers "to tell the Iraqis that a
ceasefire had occurred," no loudspeakers were used in this specific
postwar massacre. Apache helicopters armed with laser-guided Hellfire missiles
slaughtered the Iraqi troops and the army footage of the fight obtained by Newsday
recorded one U.S. soldier joking, "Say hello to Allah" as he fired a
hellfire missile.
To
cover over the carnage, Saudi "mortuary platoons" quickly moved to
bury the bodies without ascertaining whether the bodies were Iraqi, Kuwaiti,
Palestinian, or Asian guest-workers.[19]
An episode shown on CNN on March 11 depicted the digging of mass graves for the
massacred Iraqi troops, reduced to burnt-out corpses. But the mainstream media
did little after the initial reports to investigate the Desert Slaughter,
ranging from the bombing of Iraqis fleeing north to Baghdad or Basra, to those
caught on the Highway of Death and other killing fields in Kuwait. No
discussion took place either concerning who was responsible for the desert
slaughter. Schwarzkopf had ordered at the start of the ground war "not to
let anybody or anything out of Kuwait City" (Newark Star-Ledger,
Feb. 27, 1991) and after the war Air Force General Merrill McPeak (1991)
stated: "I think we have tried to disarm the Iraqi Army as humanely as
possible." But then he then admitted that: "It's during this phase
that the true fruits of victory are achieved from combat, when the enemy's
disorganized" (1991). Yet
what military "fruits" were realized in these senseless slaughters?
Reports
indicated that many of those retreating from Kuwait City had put white flags on
their vehicles which were visible to U.S. pilots (Rowan Scarborough, "Pool
Report Aboard the USS Blue Ridge," Washington Times, Feb.
27, 1991) and, as noted, there were many reports that Kuwaitis, Palestinians,
and other civilians were massacred by U.S. forces. Consequently, there were claims
that the slaughter of retreating Iraqis and others constituted a war crime,
violating "the Geneva Conventions of 1949, Common Article III, which
outlaws the killing of soldiers who are out of combat" (Joyce Chediac,
"The Massacre of Withdrawing Soldiers on 'The Highway of Death,'" in
Clark et al. 1992, p. 91). The Bush administration claimed that the Iraqi
troops were retreating to regroup and were thus in "fighting
retreat," but, in fact, they were a "fleeing rabble," as the
Pentagon would eventually admit.
Thus
the high-tech massacre of the fleeing Iraqis stands as an example of systematic
extermination and is the perfect expression of technocratic war, of
systematically annihilating the enemy by wiping out anything that moves. This
was the fruit of U.S. technowar: the massive production of death and
extermination of the Iraqi military and whoever happened to be in the way of
the U.S. Armada of Winged Death. The Highway of Death thus served as the most
dramatic demonstration of U.S. killing power and provided a fitting and
necessary ending to a war dedicated from the beginning to the destruction of
the Iraqi military. The Desert Slaughter clearly demonstrated that (1) war is
hell; (2) war is not a viable solution to political conflicts; and (3)
thus war is obsolete as a mode of contemporary conflict resolution. The Gulf
war vividly demonstrated the lethality of high-tech weapons systems and the
tremendous damage that they are capable of inflicting on the social-industrial
infrastructure of a system, the environment, and human life. While the claims
for precision and cleanness of the high-tech weapons systems were surely
exaggerated, in fact the U.S. proved that it could systematically slaughter a
fleeing army and destroy the economic and social infrastructure of a country.
The Gulf war also clearly discloses the tremendous environmental damage which
high-tech weapons systems inflict on the environment, suggesting that modern
warfare is a form of environmental terrorism and even ecocide.
10.3
Environmental Holocaust
In
addition to the human holocaust produced by the massacre of Iraqis by the
U.S.-led coalition and the systematic destruction of Iraq's infrastructure, the
Gulf war also produced an environmental holocaust. It resulted from the
U.S.-led coalition bombing of oil wells and oil tankers in Iraq and Kuwait,
Iraq's torching of oil wells and deliberate pouring of oil into the Gulf, and
coalition bombing of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons facilities in
Iraq. Every day, during the last
week of the war and for weeks thereafter, there were TV images of the pollution
of the Gulf and, especially, images of the polluted air from the burning oil
wells.
On
a March 1 CNN report, Reid Collins noted that Iraq had set explosives on all
900 oil fields in Kuwait and that allied bombings had set some of them off,
causing a portion of the oil fires. He cited Kuwaiti government officials who
claimed that even though the Iraqis had torched many of the wells as they were
leaving the country, if the coalition forces had acted sooner they could have
saved some of them. This story, however, of Kuwaitis criticizing the U.S.
prosecution of the war, was quick to disappear and did not surface in the New
York Times or most other mainstream media sources.
In
retrospect, if Bush had chosen to negotiate a diplomatic settlement to end the
war, most of the oil fires could have been prevented. In fact, the entire
environmental holocaust was directly a result of Bush's decision to pursue a
military solution to the crisis in the Gulf by launching an air war and ground
war, and to refuse any negotiated settlement. At major environmental
conferences before the war began, it was argued that if war broke out in such
an ecologically sensitive area, there was sure to be an environmental
catastrophe and this was undeniably what resulted. Furthermore, had Bush not
insisted on the ground war, a settlement could have been negotiated that would
have saved the Kuwaiti oil wells and the Gulf environment from the ensuing
holocaust. George Bush and Saddam Hussein thus emerge from the Gulf war as two
of the greatest environmental terrorists in history.
News
reports of March 1 contained disturbing new details concerning the ecological
holocaust caused by the Gulf war.[20]
CNN reported through the day that the black, sooty smoke and toxic acid rain
from the burning oil wells caused concern about the health of children, the
aged, and those vulnerable to pollution in what one ecologist called: "A
very, very difficult and perhaps dangerous situation." Other reports
described the plumes of black acrid smoke filled with sulphur that made day
look like night and made it hard to breath in some places in Kuwait and Saudi
Arabia. The pollution was already producing acid rain throughout the area, with
smoke rising to 10,000 feet, but the real danger would appear if the smoke rose
to 30,000 feet, where it could hit the jet stream and travel around the earth.
Substantial fear existed that warmer weather in the summer would make this
possible, which could bring falling temperatures and acid rain that could
destroy rice crops and other agriculture in India and Southeast Asia. Another
expert saw the effects of the fires limited to the area; he didn't see the
pollution effecting India or Southeast Asia. Work was soon to begin on dealing
with the oil fires as three Texas firms were contracted to put them out, a
process that could have taken from one to six years.
As
it turned out, the Kuwaiti government initially gave contracts to extinguish
the oil fires only to U.S. firms and put Bechtal corporation in charge of
hiring companies to squelch the fires. Various Australian, German, Japanese and
other companies wanted to participate in the process, but the Kuwaiti
government and their American friends prevented them from sharing in the
activity.[21] This
obstacle obviously inhibited and delayed the extinction of the fires, and
reports began to circulate of pollution from the fires ranging from India to
China to Germany. By September 1991 there were reports that the pollution from
the oil fires, combined with volcanic ash from Mt. Pinitubo in the Philippines,
had circled the earth in a sooty haze and threatened to create a nuclear
winter, lowering the temperature of the earth and perhaps producing an
environmental catastrophic of cataclysmic proportions.[22]
Although
the oil fires were reportedly extinguished by November 1991, concerns continued
to mount concerning the large number of uncapped high-pressure wells still
spewing fountains of oil into the air, producing rivers and lakes of oil
throughout Kuwait, up to a mile long (Tokar 1991). The National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration chief scientist, Dr. John Robinson, "announced
at a September [1991] briefing that there are an almost unbelievable 175 million
barrels worth of oil (over seven billion gallons of oil at 42 gallons
per barrel) lying on the ground in Kuwait. Oil is still pouring out of the
ruptured underground casings of many of the extinguished wells. The Hawaiian
wildlife protection group Earthtrust reports that migrating birds often mistake
the oil lakes for water, facing almost certain death once they come into
contact with the toxic pools" (Tokar 1991, p. 58). The British journal New
Scientist reported (November 9, 1991) on the danger that the deluge of oil
might wash into the Gulf and there was also dangers of the oil polluting the
water supply and invisible poisonous vapors emanating from evaporating oil (see
Vialls 1991). These sources indicate that the lakes of oil make it difficult to
stem the flow of oil from the high-pressure wells, and it is thus still
uncertain to what extent the out-of-control Kuwait oil wells will destroy the
environment of Kuwait and the surrounding Gulf.
There
was also the question of environmental contamination by coalition bombing of
Iraqi oil refineries, factories, and their nuclear, chemical, and biological
weapons industries (see 5.3). On March 2, C-SPAN cablecast a press conference
with the Worldwide Institute where two environmentalists answered questions on
the environmental implications of the Persian Gulf war. Christopher Flavin
noted that it was certain that there would be significant contamination of the
immediate environment through the bombing of these facilities. The key
questions, however, concerned the extent of the contamination and its nature.
Obviously, the water supply could be threatened by potential contamination, and
agriculture might also be affected. Yet as of this writing, although there has
been a significant UN effort to inspect whether Iraq is continuing its
biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons programs, there have been no official
reports released on environmental contamination by the coalition bombing.
As
it turned out, Iraq had moved much of the crucial nuclear material which
escaped the allied bombing so that the bombing of Iraq's nuclear facilities
merely risked an environmental holocaust with little benefit. Obviously,
nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons are a menace, but it is arguable that
the issue could be better dealt with through negotiations calling for
dismantlement of unconventional weapons programs and through UN-imposed
restrictions on nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons production throughout
the world. In this way, there could be an international boycott imposed against
supplying Iraq's and other nuclear, biological and chemical weapons programs,
with strict inspection to guarantee compliance. The U.S., by contrast, dropped
tons of bombs on Iraq's weapons facilities, causing a level of environmental contamination
that is still unascertained, while falsely claiming that the bombing had
eliminated Iraq's unconventional weapons capacities. Further, George Bush has
yet to support limiting military sales to the Middle East, raising suspicions
that part of the motivation for the Gulf war was precisely to increase U.S.
arms sales to the region.
Discussion
began after the war concerning the need to develop stricter environmental laws
during wartime and the need to have something like a Geneva Convention for
environmental crimes by ecoterrorists.[23]
The Gulf war revealed once again that the imperialist and militarist mind, has
no environmental consciousness. Technowar utilizes advanced informational and
military technology to carry out systematic destruction of enemy troops and to
dominate the battlefield. Technowar is the latest project in what the Frankfurt
school called the domination of nature, a project that inexorably results in
social domination and ecological destruction of the environment (Kellner
1989a). Technowar disregards the environment in its war plans and does not
concern itself with ecological issues except as they impinge on warfare and
politics. The military perspective does not recognize embeddedness in nature
but, like modern science and technology, is concerned with the sovereignty of
the subject over nature. The Other, be it people or the environment, is
conceived as the stuff of domination, mere matter to be controlled or
destroyed. The madness of this project was clearly revealed in the Gulf war in
the wanton destruction of the environment by both sides.
Thus,
the devastation of the Persian Gulf shows the need to avoid wars, which in an
era of high-tech warfare constitute a form of environmental terrorism. I have
noted that early in the war Bush removed all environmental restraints on the
Pentagon and to the present has blocked government agencies from revealing
information concerning the environmental effects of the Gulf war. Thus, we see
in retrospect, and too late, that "untying the hands" of the Pentagon
meant in practice giving them unrestricted power to wreak maximum destruction
on the environment and human beings. The Gulf war showed once again the
disregard for the environment within the military and political establishments
in the United States and elsewhere, as well as the need to abolish war in the
contemporary era as a mode of conflict resolution.
10.4 Iraq
Explodes/Saddam Hangs On
While
George Bush won tremendous acclaim for his "victory" in the Gulf war,[24]
Saddam Hussein was forced to struggle for his very survival. Hussein faced a
relentless propaganda war against him in the West and internal unrest and
eventually upheaval at home. At the end of the war, all the TV networks
featured talk shows on what to do about Saddam. One of the favorite topics was
whether war crimes trials should be instituted against him, and the
advisability of assassinating him was also discussed. Another preferred genre
was commentary on the fate of fallen tyrants, although such obituaries were
somewhat premature because--to the present at least--Hussein has managed to
hold onto power. On February 28, for instance, CNN raised the question
"what's next for Saddam Hussein?" CNN described him as joining
"a long list of dictators who were brought down" and offered a CNN
perspective by Bill Moyers.
Moyers
intoned that it was good that the world was rid of another dictator who the
United States supported and then had to be taken down--Batista, Somoza, Marcos,
the shah of Iran, and Noriega. Saddam is next, Moyers opined, one more
Frankenstein monster rampaging out of the laboratory who had to be hunted down.
Moyers recalled that Reagan and Bush supported Saddam during the Iraq/Iran war,
as did "armchair warriors" Sen. Alan Simpson (R-Wyo.) and Rep.
Stephen Solarz (D-NY.) who gained political capital in attacking Saddam Hussein
during the Persian Gulf war, but who earlier groveled in his presence when he
was "just our bad guy."
They armed him and allowed him to become the neighborhood bully, Moyers
explained.
Although
Moyers's portrait of the fallen dictator was premature, his Frankenstein
metaphor was apt because it implied that there were creators of the Iraqi
military machine who should be held responsible (though one could question
whether monster metaphors promote intelligent political discourse). Moyers then
pointed out that the Gulf war was not an even match: Iraq is about the size of
Texas and has about as many people. Its military was exhausted by the Iran/Iraq
war and it had no air force willing to fight. Its front-line troops were
dragged off the streets of Baghdad and put in the desert with ill-fitted
uniforms and no training, and, as for his doomsday weapons, "the better
grandma to fool you." The truth, Moyers argued, was that Iraq was a Third
World country with a fifth-rate economy. After this accurate analysis, Moyers
then called Saddam Hussein "a world class psychopath" who "could
play Rambo against Kuwait, but in confronting the allied military, he was just
the mouse that roared." The sooner he's gone the better, Moyers concluded,
though many of those now chasing him had encouraged him in the first place.
All
day on March 1, the networks floated a story published in France's prestigious
paper Le Monde that Saddam Hussein was going to flee to Algeria and that
the Algerian government was cutting a deal for his escape. Even after the
Algerian ambassador to the U.S. and the Bush administration denied the story,
CNN and the other networks continued running it. For the next week, stories of
domestic opposition to Saddam were highlighted in the U.S. media. It was hard
to distinguish disinformation from genuine rebellion, but the flood of refugees
from Basra and southern Iraq gave credence to stories that there was
significant opposition to Hussein's rule (obviously, one could not trust
anything that the U.S. military or Bush administration might say about Hussein
or Iraq). There were repeated stories that rebellions were exploding: in the
North of Iraq by Kurds and in the south by disgruntled military, townspeople
who had suffered during the war, and fundamentalist Shiite Moslems, encouraged
by Iran, who opposed Hussein's Baath party and Sunni Moslem regime.[25]
Some of these stories were clear exaggeration, mixing information with
disinformation: CNN and the other TV networks reported that the Kurds
completely controlled the north of Iraq, that Hussein's son was killed in Basra
along with other leaders of his regime, that oppositional forces controlled
cities throughout southern Iraq, and that Hussein had been assassinated. In
fact, Hussein's son was not killed and although rebel forces were in control of
large amounts of the country, Hussein's forces were able to regain the
initiative--thanks largely to the inactivity of Bush who failed to support the
rebellions he had called for.[26]
The
recurrent stories of fighting in the south of Iraq indicated that there was
genuine insurrectionary turmoil in Iraq, and its decision to eject all foreign
journalists on March 6 suggested that Iraq was preparing to deal with this
turmoil violently--as they did. Reuters reported that the Republican Guards
were on patrol in the streets of Baghdad and that road blocks had been put up
on the approaches to the city in order to tighten security and to prevent
rebellion from breaking out in the capital. CNN also reported on March 6 that
Saddam Hussein had appointed his cousin as internal security minister.
Hussein's relative, Ali Hassan al-Majid, had brutally suppressed Kurdish
rebellions in the 1980s and was in charge of the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait
during a period of many atrocities.
Commentators
saw these moves as a show of force, indicating that Saddam Hussein was acting
decisively to maintain his regime. Many commented that while Hussein was
obviously unable to successfully fight tremendously superior U.S.-led coalition
forces, he was able to maintain order and power in his own country. Thus the New
York Times reported on March 7: "Despite Western assessments of the
Republican Guard's disarray, Western officials in Saudi Arabia said loyalist
troops had apparently put down an Islamic revolt in Basra, Iraq's second
largest city, where rebellious Shiites claimed to have control over the
weekend" (p. A8). In fact, it was later reported that the elite Republican
Guard was "virtually intact" after the ceasefire and that reports of
its destruction were greatly exaggerated (Newsday, July 7, 1991, p. 7).
For
the first time, Iraqi and Kurdish oppositional leaders were shown on U.S. TV.
Although they repeated the standard attacks on Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi
opposition seemed to have had no coherent program, no unity among their ranks,
and no organized movement inside or outside Iraq. They continued to bicker
among themselves and no viable Iraqi opposition emerged to replace Hussein and
his regime. The U.S. had apparently done nothing to try to help organize a
democratic opposition to Hussein and never made the democratization of Iraq a
war aim.
Yet
during the war, the Bush administration had urged the Iraqis to overthrow
Saddam Hussein and in the aftermath CIA and covert forces were urging them to
do so.[27]
Thus, it appeared that systematic efforts were underway throughout Iraq to
topple Hussein's regime.
But the Bush administration backed off in their campaign against Hussein
precisely when these rebellions appeared potentially able to eliminate the
Iraqi government. While Bush and his team had repeatedly urged Hussein's
overthrow, they were not taking any public position on the unrest in Iraq and
did nothing to publicly encourage oppositional forces. Perhaps they could find
no cohesive oppositional forces to support and perhaps they simply did not have
a coherent policy to deal with Iraq after the war. No doubt, the Bush
administration worried about Shiite forces taking over southern Iraq and
pursuing a fundamentalist Islamic revolution in the Iranian mode. Although one
could do business with a Saddam Hussein, buying his oil and selling him arms,
it was not certain that Islamic revolution in the Gulf would serve U.S.
interests.
After
putting down the rebellions in the south, Hussein sent his forces north to
crush Kurdish rebellions. The Kurds were driven out of their homeland and
sought refuge in the harsh mountain region near the border with Turkey and a
desolate border region near Iran. Bush's failure to respond to the suffering of
the Kurds, Shiites, and other forces rebelling against the regime of Saddam
Hussein exposed the phoniness of his highly touted New World Order. To those
who hoped that henceforth the superpowers would promote justice, democracy, and
the cause of oppressed peoples against brutal domination, Bush clearly
demonstrated that for him the New World Order was merely an order of
Realpolitik, of selfishly following his own perceived interests with little
concern for the suffering or just causes of others.
Kuwait
was of concern to the Bush administration because of the economic and
geopolitical interests involved, as well as the benefits that Bush, the
Pentagon, and the military-industrial complex would reap from a successful war.
But the fate of the Kurds and the Iraqi people obviously meant nothing to Bush
who seemed not have an idealistic impulse in his personality. When Bush
appealed to lofty moral principles during the Gulf crisis and war, this was
sheer hypocrisy for there is little or no evidence that George Bush has ever
exhibited a consistent adherence to moral principles. He is the paradigm of the
narrow, opportunistic, and insincere politician who solely follows his own
interests and those of his class while caring nothing for the unfortunate and
oppressed. His lack of concern for principle was clearly evident on television
during March and April. When he went on vacation in April, TV juxtaposed images
of fleeing and dying Kurds with pictures of Bush playing golf and
"recreating" in his upper-class life-style. Images of Bush joggin',
fishin', and playin' tennis juxtaposed with images of thousands of Kurdish
refugees freezing, starving, and dying on the Turkish and Iranian border area
was truly repellent. Consequently, many commentators saw Bush's inaction as
moral bankruptcy and political failure of nerve. As Doug Ireland put it:
If,
as Bush claimed, Saddam really was the "new Hitler," and the need to
emasculate him the most important moral issue since World War II, the logic of
the administration's policy would have dictated some form of intervention at
the first signs of revolt, when it could have aided those who responded to
America's call with a minimum of direct military involvement--keeping Saddam's
air arms from the skies, for example, while offering weapons, training,
military counsel, and food and medical aid to the rebel coalition, through
client states if necessary (a long-standing U.S. practice around the world in
other, less urgent circumstances). Bush's failure to do so reveals that the
administration's rationale for his bloody war--with its hundred of thousands of
casualties, most of them morally innocent conscripts or civilians--was a lie
from the gitgo" (The Village Voice, April 16, 1991, p. 8).
This
raises the question of why Bush chose to end the war when he did and why he did
not go further in destroying the Iraqi military and overthrowing Saddam
Hussein. In a March 27 interview with David Frost on PBS, General Schwarzkopf
said that he personally wanted to continue fighting, to pursue a "war of
annihiliation."[28]
A rightwing critique of the end of the war has emerged, presented by U.S.
News and World Report in their book Triumph Without Victory (1992)
that criticizes the premature ending of the war. The team that produced the
book claimed that the war had been originally planned for 144 hours, but was
halted after 100 hours, primarily because of pressure by Arab coalition
partners who did not want to see Iraq dismembered and a radical Shiite regime
emerge in the south and autonomous Kurdish republic emerge in the north (1992,
pp. 395ff). This led to a failure of nerve on Bush's account and a "tragic
conclusion" to the Gulf war (1992, p. 400).
Arab
pressure on Bush to end the war and U.S. and Arab aversion to seeing a radical
Shiite regime emerge might have been part of the reason for Bush ending the
war, but, like the causes of the war, the conclusion too is overdetermined and
requires a multi-causal analysis (see 1.3). Bulloch (1991) argues that Bush had
won an adequate victory with minimum losses and did not want to risk losing
further troops in a battle for Baghdad or the annihiliation of the Iraqi army;
consequently, many Iraqi divisions survived intact. On a 1992 Discovery Channel
documentary organized by the American Enterprise Institute, Assistant Secretary
of State Paul Wolfowitz said that reports of the slaughter of the fleeing
Iraqis had produced revulsion in the Pentagon and Powell called the operation
to a halt, not wanting to produce the appearence of the U.S. forces
"piling on," to use Wolfowitz's football metaphor. Others claim that
the U.S. had faulty intelligence that led them to believe that the Iraqis would
definitely overthrow Saddam Hussein and end his regime (interview with Garth
Jowett who cited discussions with U.S. government sources, Houston, March 9,
1992).
No
doubt at least some of these considerations influenced the decision to end the
war, but there might have also been a cunning and cynical calculation that
Saddam Hussein's continuation in power might be useful. The survival of Saddam
Hussein provided an enemy and bogeyman in the area to legitimate keeping U.S.
military forces in the Middle East and to help keep up the military budget to
deal with such villainous threats to U.S. interests. In addition, a threatening
Hussein could help promote the sale of U.S. arms to the region. Perhaps Saddam
Hussein was more useful to George Bush alive than dead or disposed of.[29]
If Bush fell behind in the 1992 election, he could always mount a strike
against Hussein and mobilize popular support for the action. If he won the
presidency and found the economy in a slump and his popularity slumping, he
could mount a war against Iraq to generate public support.
Whatever
Bush's motivations for ending the war when he did, Hussein's military
slaughtered rebels by the scores in southern Iraq, often within kilometers of
U.S. military forces, while the United States sat back and allowed the
slaughter to take place. Eventually, the TV coverage of the plight of the
Kurds, however, was so heart-wrenching that U.S. forces were sent to northern
Iraq so that the Kurds, starving and freezing in inhospitable refuges in Turkey
and Iran, could return home under the protection of the U.S.-led coalition
forces.[30]
Obviously, at any time Bush could have ordered U.S. troops to create a buffer
zone to protect the Kurds from the Iraqi army and his failure to do so clearly
revealed his lack of moral fiber. Indeed, even some of his strongest defenders
in the Gulf war such as William Safire and Jim Hoagland severely criticized
Bush's inaction.
But
during the summer of 1991, the U.S. troops pulled out of northern and southern
Iraq and Saddam Hussein continued to rule the country. Consequently, the Gulf
war produced nothing for Iraq but incredible misery. A UN team described the
appalling conditions in most of the country, with massive disease,
malnutrition, lack of adequate medical care, and primitive conditions:
Nothing that we
had seen or read had quite prepared us for the particular form of devastation
which has now befallen the country. The recent conflict has wrought
near-apocalyptic results upon the economic infrastructure of what had been,
until January 1991, a rather highly urbanized and mechanized society. Now most
means of modern life support have been destroyed or rendered tenuous. Iraq has,
for some time to come, been relegated to a pre-industrial age, but with all the
disabilities of post-industrial dependency on an intensive use of energy and
technology (Ahtisaari in Clark et.
al 1992, pp. 237-238).
During
the rest of 1991, reports continued to circulate of growing health problems,
starvation, economic collapse, and hopelessness in Iraq.[31]
The U.S. policy of "bomb now, die later" produced for the Iraqi
people epidemics of cholera, typhoid, and other deadly diseases and the lack of
medicine and medical equipment to deal with even minor problems. Iraqi children
were dying of starvation and disease, and Bush continued to insist on an
economic boycott of Iraq. Saddam Hussein built up Baghdad and strengthened his
military and security apparatus. The Gulf war had brought nothing but
incredible suffering to the Iraqi people while failing to destroy the regime of
Saddam Hussein or to bring peace and stability to the region.
10.5
The Militarization of U.S. Culture and Society
In
retrospect, only George Bush, the U.S. military, and the military-industrial
complex benefited from the Gulf war. Kotz and Larudee (1991) noted: "After
years of lackluster performance, eight of the leading U.S. arms contractors saw
their stock value rise by $5.3 billion in the month after the war began"
(p. 17). Moreover, White House Budget Director Richard Darman said that arms
inventories would be restored to their level before the war, leading Sen. Tom
Harkins (D-Ia.) to complain that the Pentagon planned to buy 500 more Patriot
missiles although only 160 were fired (p. 17). The Wall Street Journal
reported on February 27, 1991, that the Bush administration wanted to place the
$54.5 billion pledged by coalition allies to underwrite the U.S. Gulf war
effort, along with $15 billion in U.S. funds, into an account that it could
spend without pesky congressional oversight.
The
Gulf war also greatly helped promote foreign arms sales.[32]
The Toronto Star (Aug. 12, 1991, p. A3) reported the, "U.S. [was]
tops in supplying Third World weaponry" in 1990, increasing arms sales
from nearly $8 billion in 1989 to $18.5 billion in 1990. Sales to Middle
Eastern countries produced the dramatic upsurge. The success of new military
technologies in the Gulf war led the Bush administration to push anew their
Strategic Defense Initiative, popularly known as Star Wars. In his March 6
speech to Congress, Bush called for expansion of the program and has continued
urging the development of high-tech weapons systems against congressional
pressure for deeper military cuts. Tom Wicker wrote in an August 2, 1991,
syndicated column that "the Pentagon still is seeking more than $500
billion of taxpayers' money for 'about 100 major weapons-acquisitions
programs.'"
And so George Bush, the U.S. military, and the military-industrial complex were the immediate beneficiaries of the Gulf War.[33] Bush was transformed from wimp to warrior and the U.S. military was able to overcome its humiliation in Vietnam and its past failures. The U.S. appeared to be the world's sole remaining superpower, a high-tech military colossus dominating Bush's New World Order.[34] On the whole, the military had not gotten such good press and PR since World War II. From the beginning through the aftermath of the war, nightly newscasts interviewed military spokespeople and defenders, presented positive images of military hardware and troops, and legitimated the alleged need for a strong military. The military was concerned with overcoming the "Vietnam syndrome" and restoring their credibility. Television coverage of the c