UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

 

SAN FRANCISCO NAACP, et al,

                        Plaintiffs,

            vs.

SAN FRANCISCO UNIFIED SCHOOL  DISTRICT, et al,

                        Defendants

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    No. C-78 1445 WHO

 

    (Related Case: Ho v. SFUSD,

         No. C-94-2418 WHO)

   

    RESPONSE OF CONSENT DECREE

    MONITOR TO 3/2/01 WORKING DRAFT

    OF COMPREHENSIVE PLAN

   

 

 

As the SFNAACP v. SFUSD Consent Decree Monitor for the State of California, I am filing this response to the SFUSD Draft Comprehensive Plan, pursuant to the February 27, 2001 order of this Court.

 

At the outset, the monitoring team would like to commend the district for its efforts in drafting a substantial and thorough comprehensive plan.  A tremendous amount of time and effort has been expended, and the entire process – facilitated by this Court under the Consent Decree – promises to benefit all students in the district.

 

We were particularly pleased with the level of specificity included in this working document, especially in the sections relating to literacy goals, on-site staff development, and programmatic changes.  The district has moved from the preliminary steps articulated in the parties’ Third Joint Report to a much more concrete set of directions.

 

In light of these positive steps, we would endorse the district’s goal of extending the Consent Decree beyond the December 2002 target date to enable district officials to meet their step-by-step objectives.  Unforeseen circumstances occurring since the adoption of the Ho Settlement Agreement have significantly delayed the anticipated transition to unitary status.  The district has seen two major changes in leadership over the past three years.  First came the unexpected departure of Superintendent Rojas and the sudden exodus of most key members of his leadership team.  A year later, Superintendent Ackerman replaced Interim Superintendent Davis, and a substantial transformation has taken place, both with regard to district leadership as well as with regard to policy.  The district legal team has also undergone significant change during this time, as has the leadership and composition of the School Board.  In addition, SFUSD was hit with a series of unexpected financial crises that have necessarily dominated the day-to-day decision-making process.

 

During these past two years, we were consistently frustrated by the lack of any active intervention on the part of the district to address resegregation by creating a viable new student assignment plan.  Now that the leadership situation has stabilized, however, and new directions have been set forth consistent with Consent Decree principles and goals, it is certainly appropriate to consider an extension of the decree so that the young people of the district can fully benefit from its mandates and the City can see this through to a positive conclusion. 

 

Yet while it is clear that additional time is needed, it is not clear from the Draft Comprehensive Plan that SFUSD would require five full additional years to meet its objectives under the decree.  We urge the district to bolster the draft by including the additional evidence that would warrant such an extension.  In particular, such bolstering would require more specific and complete timetables.  While some portions of the plan already contain step-by-step timetables, others are very general, with little guarantee that anything concrete will happen.  We urge the district to review the plan – especially the health-related inquiry (Page 47), the WSF Pilot Program (Page 48), and the Accountability for All section (Pages 91-93) – and set forth more specific timetables in this context.

 

*******

 

In addition, we would offer the following recommendations for strengthening the document.

 

  1. Directly Addressing Low-Performing Schools

 

While many of the district-wide goals and strategic steps identified in this document will necessarily help address low-performing schools, the document lacks a fully articulated vision regarding specific steps that must be taken to turn around SFUSD’s chronically low-performing schools.  At the present time, these schools include – but are not limited to – Starr King Elementary, Gloria R. Davis & Potrero Hill Middle Schools, and Balboa, McAteer, and Mission High Schools.

 

From the beginning, a central feature of the Consent Decree has been its focus on turning around low-performing schools.  As documented in the recent reports of the monitoring team, this focus was initially manifested in the efforts directed toward improving the so-called “Phase One” schools.[1]  From 1993 through 1997, pursuant to the recommendations in the 1992 Committee of Experts’ report and the mandate specified in the parties’ Second Joint Report, the CSIP/Reconstitution process was implemented district-wide…under a requirement that three schools per year were to be reconstituted “until the task is completed.”[2]  The revised and updated Special Plan for Bayview Hunters Point – released in 1995 – provided a vision for extending the original Consent Decree principles and goals throughout the entire district, and this vision clearly informed district practices during that era.[3] 

 

Negotiations with the teachers union from 1997 through 1999 focused on modifying this process and identifying new directions for addressing low-performing schools, but these negotiations were suspended when the new Immediate Intervention/Underperforming Schools Program (II/USP) for low-performing schools was adopted in SFUSD pursuant to the new Public Schools Accountability Act.[4]  The district is now in its second year of II/USP, and most – although not all – of the chronically low-performing schools are involved.

 

A separate section of the Comprehensive Plan -- informed by this recent history,  addressing the role that II/USP will necessarily play, and identifying additional strategies both for the II/USP schools and for those low-performing schools not involved in the program – would be an essential component of such a document. 

 

The importance of identifying additional strategies to turn around low-performing schools is reflected in the focus on McAteer High School in the monitoring team’s Supplemental Report to this Court, dated February 12, 2001.  While the district’s comprehensive plan does include two ideas aimed at turning McAteer around, these ideas by themselves offer little chance that anything will change.  The Comprehensive Plan envisions the re-locating of the Curriculum Improvement and Professional Development (CIPD) offices to the McAteer grounds, and discusses exploratory steps that may lead to the establishment of a teacher academy at the school.  But there is no evidence that district offices at the same sprawling and underutilized facility will have any positive effect whatsoever.  And a teacher academy – even if it is ultimately established – may or may not change anything.  These ideas are good starting points, but they cannot replace the sort of detailed vision for turning low-performing schools around that is embodied in the original Special Plan for Bayview-Hunters Point – a plan that achieved significant success at the time.[5]

 


  1. Student Assignment Methodology

 

The district is to be commended for its detailed and substantial efforts to come up with a new student assignment plan that would be consistent with both the original mandate of the Consent Decree and the requirements of the Ho Settlement Agreement.  As we stated in the February 2001 Supplemental Report (at Page 17), “A new student assignment plan is an absolute necessity at the present time.”

 

One point in the draft document, however, bears particular scrutiny.  The district proposes a series of steps that may include the use of race if and only if, after the seven-factor process is implemented, a school becomes racially identifiable.  The implication is that the district will act unilaterally in this regard.  Yet it must be noted that Paragraph G of the Ho Settlement Agreement includes a step-by-step process that would involve all the parties in the event of  “identifiable racial or ethnic concentration at a particular school.”[6]  It may be appropriate, therefore, to re-work this feature of the student assignment methodology so that it might be situated within the framework that has already been agreed upon by the parties and approved by this Court.

 

  1. Other Areas of Concern

 

    1. Computer Technology in the Classrooms - The Draft Comprehensive Plan  contains no vision for the use of technology in the district.  Paragraphs 17, 21, 22, 23, and 24 in the Consent Decree's Special Plan for Bayview-Hunters Point Schools explicitly recognize the importance of access to computer technology and the central role that it can play in facilitating the goals of academic achievement.  Indeed, under the updated Special Plan for Bayview-Hunters Point, “…use of technology, including computer support of curriculum…” was identified as one of seven major components that should be replicated throughout SFUSD.  At one point, SFUSD was on the cutting edge in this regard, but we have seen increasing evidence in recent years that the district is falling significantly behind in this area.  In some schools, equipment is hopelessly outdated.  In others, new computers sit unused – either because of wiring problems or because school personnel do not have a clear idea of how they can or should be used.  It is essential that the district bring in a new Chief Technology Officer and update the 1993 Technology Master Plan.

 

b.      Parent & Community Participation – In the 1983 decision by this Court approving the original Consent Decree, it was noted that “the District must continue to encourage and improve participation by parent, students, staff, and other members of the community in developing programs for desegregation and academic excellence.   The parties are authorized to submit further recommendations to the Court to assure adequate community representation in the implementation of the Decree.”[7]  Yet this Draft Comprehensive Plan contains little or no direction in this regard.  At selected school sites over the years, we have noted the success of PTA programs, beacon schools, and community outreach in general.  We urge SFUSD to replicate these successful strategies district-wide.

 

c.       Principal Staff Development – It is clear that much of this plan depends on the ability of principals to implement professional development programs and devise new monitoring techniques at the local school site level.  Yet there is virtually nothing in the document regarding the training of the principals for these complex and multi-faceted tasks.  In previous reports, we have urged the district to strengthen principal staff development, and a first step in this process would be the inclusion of specific steps toward that goal in the revised comprehensive plan.

 

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            Pursuant to the February 27, 2001 Order of this Court, we look forward to the responses of the parties and to the further positive steps that the district will be taking to revise and update its comprehensive plan.

 

 

 

Dated:  March 26, 2001                                                                   Respectfully submitted,

           

 

 

 

 

STUART BIEGEL

Consent Decree Monitor

 

 

 



[1] The first schools to be targeted at the beginning of the Consent Decree (1983-1985) continue to be called ‘Phase One’ schools.  They include George Washington Carver, Charles Drew, and Malcolm X (formerly Sir Francis Drake) elementary schools, Martin Luther King and Horace Mann middle schools, and Phillip & Sala Burton High.  King and Burton were brand-new schools, created by the Consent Decree.  The other four were reconstituted.

[2] See Report #17 (at Page 162):  “As documented at great length in previous reports, the Comprehensive Schools Improvement Program (CSIP) and the accompanying reconstitution process for schools that did not improve were at the center of an explicit SFUSD plan to improve academic achievement in the 1990’s.  Under this process, low-performing schools were placed on a CSIP list and targeted for close monitoring and additional reform efforts.  Most "graduated" from the list after two years, but 9 were reconstituted from 1994 through 1997…with district officials bringing in new administrators and substantially new staffs to replace existing personnel.  In addition, during this same time period, three new Consent Decree schools were established, and one other low-performing school was disestablished.  These actions brought the total of dramatic changes for the entire fifteen-year reconstitution period (1983-1997) to 15 schools reconstituted, five new Consent Decree schools established, and one high school disestablished.”

[3] The report by the Committee of Experts in 1992 had concluded that the implementation of the Consent Decree’s Special Plan for Bayview-Hunters Point Schools was the major cause of success at Phase One schools.  Thus the committee recommended that the district update the plan for use in the 1990’s, and that this plan be implemented in all targeted schools under the decree.  Pursuant to this recommendation -- and consistent with the recommendations in the parties’ Second Joint Report -- the district moved forward to update the Special Plan for Bayview-Hunters Point and to implement it throughout the City.  See Special Plan for Bayview-Hunters Point Schools, Draft Update, SFUSD Division for Integration, April, 1995.

[4] See Public Schools Accountability Act of 1999, Immediate Intervention/ Underperforming Schools Program, Cal. Educ. Code, Article 3, Sections 52053-52055.5.  See generally Report #17, at Pages 162-172.

[5] Comments in this regard, set forth in Report #17 (at Page 172), bear repeating at this time:

 

“In past reports, we have found that the two most successful reform efforts targeting low-performing schools over the entire 17-year period of the Consent Decree have been the Phase One reforms of 1983-1985 and the CSIP/Reconstitution program of 1993-1997.  Although the more recent efforts were not uniformly successful, most of the schools that participated in CSIP did indeed improve.  Yet not every one of the schools that did improve has been able to sustain the momentum, and some have given up their original gains. 

 

“It must be emphasized that there is no magic formula in the world of education reform.  No one silver bullet has yet been found in this context.  Research has shown that turning around a low-performing school requires -- among other things -- the right combination of people, interpersonal communication, programs, funding, and relationships.  It requires a great deal of hard, day-to-day work over time...establishing partnerships between and among the district’s educators, the school’s students, and the local community.  Such efforts -- even if successful -- do not continue automatically.  People change, students change, circumstances change, and new relationships must be built.  Turning around a low-performing school is thus an ongoing process, not a one-time operation that can then be expected to last indefinitely.” 

 

[6] See SFNAACP v. SFUSD et al, Ho v. SFUSD et al, Opinion & Order, 59 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1026 (N.D. Cal. 1999).

[7] SFNAACP v. SFUSD et al, Opinion & Order, 576 F. Supp. 34, 42 (N.D. Cal. 1983).